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The Saving Grace
A
nation’s savings matters. Money set aside from
today’s consumption can be invested, through
financial markets, in productive assets embodying
the latest innovations. A newer and better capital
stock can provide the fuel to sustain higher rates
of growth and improve living standards.
In a nutshell, that’s the current view of many
economists, one that places savings among the
most important pillars of a nation’s long-term
economic health. Michael Mussa, economic coun-
selor and director of research at the International
Monetary Fund, summed it up: “Why is saving
important? Primarily because investment is
important.…Growth tends to be high in econo-
mies where savings and investments are both high
and reasonably well deployed, and growth tends
to be poor in economies in which savings and
investments are low or not well deployed.”
The past decade has brought a greater
appreciation of the beneficial role of savings in an
economy. Before that, many economists, using
Robert Solow’s 1956 work, argued that saving
didn’t contribute all that much to growth. Addi-
tional saving might increase the capital stock and
raise living standards, but it didn’t boost long-run
growth prospects. In the 1980s, endogenous
growth theorists began to see that additional
capital, both physical and human, gave society a
growth bonus, usually related to more rapid
technological progress. Now, most economists
recognize saving as an important factor in growth
as well as standards of living.
This shift in the profession’s views on
saving’s role in economic growth puts a spotlight
on a number of related issues. They include:
• What are the key factors that have positive
and negative influences on saving?
• Should government’s role in creating a
better environment for saving be one of
intervention or one of financial liberaliza-
tion?
• To what extent can a country make up for
low domestic saving by tapping into the
savings of other countries?
To explore these topics, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas invited economists, bankers, and
officials from the United States, Latin America, and
Europe to a symposium on “The Role of Saving in
Economic Growth,” held March 18–19, 1994, at
Houston’s Woodlands Conference Center. This
article summarizes the proceedings. In a statement
to open the conference, Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan said: “We need to understand
better the role of various factors determining
saving currently and in the past so we can shape
policies that encourage rather than discourage
saving and investment. Only in that event will we
be able to achieve sustainable increases in real
output and standards of living for our respective
countries.”
America’s low saving rate
Real-world observations on savings vary
over time and among countries. The national
saving rate, defined as a percentage of gross
national product (GNP), is low in the United
States compared with other industrial countries
and most of the developing world. In recent
years, U.S. saving hovered around 15 percent of
GNP. In European nations, the rates are slightly
higher. In Japan and other Asian economies, the
figure often exceeded 30 percent in the past two
decades.
The low U.S. saving rate troubles William J.
McDonough, president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. “The saving decline has
occurred across the board—by households, byFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas 44
business in the form of retained earnings and by
government, federal as well as state and local,” he
said. McDonough cited Fed research estimating
that the U.S. economy would have gained $300
billion a year, or 5 percent of potential output, if
the saving rate of 1961 to 1981 had prevailed
during the 1980s.
Interestingly, the United States hasn’t always
been a low-saving country. From the end of the
Civil War to World War II, saving and investment
were much higher in the United States than in
Europe or Japan. The U.S. postwar experience
isn’t unique, however. Other Western industrial
countries show a similar decline in saving. For
both the United States and Europe, a slight slip-
page of private saving has been worsened by
growing public-sector dissaving, or deficit spend-
ing. Looking at developing countries, the situation
is much different. There is a general upswing in
saving and investment, which has become associ-
ated with a quickening of the pace of economic
growth, particularly in East Asia.
The keys to saving
A nation’s savings includes money individu-
als put into banks or invest in stocks, bonds, and
other financial instruments. Companies also save
in the form of retained earnings, but for the most
part, the business sector taps into society’s savings
for capital spending. The public sector contributes
to a nation’s saving rate, either positively or nega-
tively. Government borrowing for current spend-
ing can siphon funds away from productive
investment, reducing the benefits of saving and
investment to the economy. Conventional statistics
often miss other spending that might properly
count as saving. The list includes the acquisition
of consumer durables and investments in human
capital, especially education and training. Infra-
structure projects add to a nation’s productive
assets, too.
Saving depends on myriad factors, many
beyond easy control of policymakers. In his
remarks, Greenspan identified many of the influ-
ences. Demographic characteristics, such as age
and the population’s average income, play a role.
So might the riskiness of available assets. Uncer-
tainty about jobs and future income can lead to
extra saving as individuals seek additional secu-
rity. Inflation can induce households to save more
to make up for the erosion of nominal assets’
values, but it redirects funds into such unproduc-
tive activities as land speculation. Financial institu-
tions’ stage of development will determine how
efficiently the savings of the private sector can be
channeled to its best uses. The openness of the
financial sector will affect how well an economy
can attract savings from around the world.
Lamberto Dini, director general of the Bank
of Italy, added psychological and cultural factors
to the list of factors that influence saving. In ethics
and religion, saving is praised. Personal experi-
ence is also probably important: the survivors of
the Great Depression or World War II “developed
a deeply rooted sense of prudence which led
them to be more frugal than those who have no
memory of the hardship brought by these tragic
events,” Dini said. Guillermo Barnes, director
general of development planning at Mexico’s
Ministry of Finance, said culture shapes saving
behavior, too. In Mexico, he said, the father of a
bride often will deplete his life savings on a three-
day wedding party.
Institutional arrangements might also affect
saving. In Asia, postal savings systems do a better
job than banks in collecting the funds of small
savers. In Chile in 1980 and Mexico in 1992, fully
funded pension plans for individuals replaced
taxpayer-funded schemes, simultaneously increas-
ing the propensity to save and reducing the ten-
dency for public-sector dissaving.
Dini offered an explanation for the decline
in saving in the Western industrial countries. In
Italy, where private saving fell from 18 percent
to 12 percent of net domestic product in three
decades, studies show that a slowdown in eco-
nomic growth explains nearly two-thirds of the
erosion of private saving. A threefold increase in
benefits for the elderly accounted for an addi-
tional third. Another factor, more prevalent in
other countries, might be financial liberalization,
which allows households greater access to credit.
As people buy more, their saving falls. In Italy,
consumer credit is still rather thin, and Dini esti-
mates that freeing it up would slice 2.5 percentage
points off the saving rate. Household saving
dropped 6 percentage points in the United King-
dom with financial deregulation between 1984
and 1988. Society’s changing institutions, more-Economic Review — Third Quarter 1994 45
over, might help explain declining saving rates.
Greater availability of insurance and welfare pro-
grams may lead individuals to spend more freely,
believing they are protected against most misfor-
tunes. Dini rejected aging of the population as a
significant factor in the decline in saving. Overall,
he concluded, “I do not believe that private saving
rates will recover significantly in the industrial
countries.”
If saving fosters economic growth, govern-
ments will be tempted to try to induce more
saving by offering incentives, often in the form of
tax breaks. Dini contended that such rainmaking
programs are more likely to alter the allocation of
savings from one market to another rather than
increase its aggregate level. Economic policy is
more likely to stimulate saving by pursuing gen-
eral objectives of stability and financial market
flexibility than by offering specific incentives to
savers, he concluded.
Latin America’s experience
The economies of Latin America provide a
prism for viewing saving and investment. Over
the past 15 years, the region went through crisis
and recovery. Many economic relationships were
convoluted by bad policies, then restored by good
ones. What’s perhaps most intriguing, from a
policy perspective, is saving’s relationship to
macroeconomic performance. In general, stability,
with low inflation and responsible fiscal policies,
favors saving and investment, both foreign and
domestic. A wild ride with inflation and excess
spending skew saving and investment decisions,
eventually strangling growth. Axel Leijonhufvud, a
professor at the University of California, looked at
Latin America’s record in the 1980s, finding that
high inflation created massive uncertainty. The
responses included shortening the length of con-
tracts and avoiding certain types of transactions
altogether, particularly long-term ones. In Argen-
tina in the late 1980s, when inflation approached
30 percent a month, it was difficult to find much
lending beyond 30 days. Capital flight is another
way of dropping out of a risky, chaotic market.
Leijonhufvud drew another, more hopeful lesson
from Argentina’s recent history: once stability
returned to the economy, functional financial
markets reemerged very quickly.
Vittorio Corbo, professor of economics at
Catholic University of Chile, pointed out that his
country’s recent experience shows that saving
does swing as a result of an economy’s ups and
downs. Chile’s gross national saving rate fell from
12 percent in the late 1970s to 7 percent in 1981
and to an all-time low of 2.4 percent in 1984. The
country suffered from external shocks and a sharp
recession. The economy recovered in the mid-
1980s, becoming the strongest in Latin America,
and the national saving rate rose to a historical
peak of 22.5 percent in 1992. Indeed, most em-
pirical work suggests a strong correlation between
a nation’s saving and the growth rate of income,
although the direction of causality can’t be easily
untangled. “It is a virtuous circle,” Corbo said. “A
higher saving rate makes possible a higher invest-
ment rate, and [a] higher investment rate in a low
distorted policy environment results in a higher
growth rate, and the higher growth rate results in
a higher saving rate, and so on. The challenge is
to get the process started.”
Ariel Buira, director of international relations
at the Bank of Mexico, presented a study of
factors shaping saving in his country. Mexico
shares many of the characteristics of developing
countries, especially those in Latin America. Its
saving rate is relatively high now—at 22 percent
to 25 percent of GDP—and the economy suffered
through several financial shocks in the 1980s.
Buira finds savings positively correlated with
income when looking at data for the period since
1965. The public sector also has a big effect. Each
1 peso reduction in deficit spending led to a 44-
to 54-centavo increase in national saving. How-
ever, private saving fell by 46 to 54 centavos,
revealing a trade-off between government and
private saving that’s less than one to one. “Public
saving only partially crowds out private saving,”
observed John Welch, vice president and market
analyst at Lehman Brothers.
In Mexico, as in many other countries,
there’s an inverse relationship between saving and
rising wealth, and between saving and the pro-
portion of the population over age 65. These
results support a lifecycle explanation for saving,
which holds that people save to ensure adequate
consumption after their working days end. The
Mexican experience shows a higher saving rate
for earners of nonwage income than for workers,Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 46
but the difference may not be all that important.
Laborers still put away 19 percent of their pay, a
figure not too far below the general rate. Inflation-
adjusted interest rates have only a marginal impact
on saving.
Buira’s research provided some insight into
some unusual aspects of Mexican saving. The first
involved effects of financial upheaval. Saving was
higher than it probably should have been from
1981 to 1985. Buira suggested Mexicans realized
income gains in 1981 were transitory, thus they
saved. A severe contraction of credit and real
wages boosted saving after 1982. Saving fell
below its predicted path in 1986, largely because
of a rise in public dissaving. The second phenom-
enon is a troublesome decline in Mexico’s saving
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A host of factors
might be at work, but Buira stressed two of them.
An increase in wealth from a boom in stock
market and real estate prices led to more con-
sumption and less saving. A cut in the budget
deficits left private-sector incomes lower, thus
reducing the ability to save.
Barnes added that it will be important to
determine whether some of the factors affecting
Mexico’s saving and investment would be tempo-
rary or permanent. In his mind, the reduction in
public-sector dissaving will last. The increased
consumption of durable goods from abroad owes
itself to pent-up demand and may not endure. “In
Mexico, we are convinced that savings are a
necessary but not sufficient condition for growth,
and those savings have to come from the country
itself,” Barnes said. “In Mexico, we are also con-
vinced that the financial sector plays a crucial role
in the saving and investment process. Therefore,
important efforts have to be made to have a more
efficient and competitive financial system.”
A high saving rate, by itself, isn’t enough to
guarantee growth and progress. Societies must
funnel resources toward productive uses. Many of
the centrally planned economies established good
saving performances over the past twenty-five
years, but the absence of market mechanisms
caused investment to inefficient and economically
wasteful projects. The economies stagnated and
eventually collapsed. Markets are not foolproof
either. Excessively cheap lending by the U.S.
savings and loan industry in the 1970s and early
1980s left an embarrassing legacy of unwanted
real estate. “It’s a mistake to believe that there is
an automatic and inflexible link between a high




If saving and investment are a big part of
what makes an economy grow, the have-not
nations aspiring to join the world’s haves will
possess plenty of reasons to learn what they can
on the subject. Interestingly, the saving part of the
equation isn’t necessarily a problem in developing
nations. Most poor countries outdo the wealthier
ones by setting aside a larger portion of GDP.
Among the reasons for this: populations tend to
be young, people don’t have the safety net of the
rich nations, and consumer credit is scarce. With
saving usually available, the critical element for
growth will be how well a society mobilizes its
savings and directs it toward productive uses. That,
of course, will depend on the institutions, regula-
tions, and practices that shape financial markets.
A crucial question is whether governments
can do a better job than financial markets in
allocating savings and investment. If that’s the
case, the creation of efficient financial markets can
be left on a back burner. In the early post-World
War II years, policies aimed at directing saving
and investment were popular. Central banks in
many poorer nations kept interest rates artificially
low, with the intent of promoting additional
investment. Regulations restricted capital flows in
an attempt to keep resources at home. Various
government schemes tried to channel money into
preferred projects.
Do these policies work? The real world
seems to offer many contradictions. Japan in the
1950s and 1960s and Korea until the mid-1980s
apparently succeeded with interventionist govern-
ments. Hong Kong and Singapore had less med-
dling but still developed rapidly. Many countries
with interventionist policies had initial success in
boosting growth rates but later paid a heavy price
as economies crumbled—the former Soviet Union
in its heyday; Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and other
Latin American countries in the late 1970s; Poland
and Yugoslavia in the 1980s.
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and public policy at Carnegie–Mellon University,
made the point that it’s difficult to make an iron-
clad case either for or against intervention in
saving and investment. Theoretical propositions
are contradictory; the evidence of experience is
inconsistent. For example, relying on private
capital markets instead of government borrowing
or guarantees in Latin America might have pro-
duced slower growth in the 1970s. Market mecha-
nisms, however, probably would have yielded
faster growth in the 1980s, when governments
had to stifle demand and investment to keep
creditors at bay.
The state may indeed direct resources to
efficient uses, especially when investing in tech-
nologies that proved their worth elsewhere. Even
so, government-directed saving and investment
raises a number of problems. Low interest rates
might inhibit saving and stifle development of the
financial sector. Money can be diverted to less
efficient or wasteful projects. Opportunities for
political intervention, favoritism, and corruption
increase with government meddling in financial
decisions. Overall, Meltzer concludes that “repressed
financial systems” haven’t offered an advantage
over liberalized financial markets: “Countries that
allow interest rates to respond to market forces do
not pay a penalty for higher rates; they generally
benefit by getting greater efficiency (or more
output) per unit or dollar invested.”
Meltzer sees the value of banks and other
financial institutions: “Developed financial markets
increase efficiency by saving transaction costs, by
eliminating the costs of barter, by reducing costs
of acquiring information, and increasing the
efficiency of investment.” Yet, the benefits don’t
make a case for activist policies to promote the
expansion of the financial sector itself. “When
there is sufficient demand for a particular service,
a competitive market will supply the service,”
Meltzer said. “Government can help to keep finan-
cial markets competitive by permitting entry and
expansion of domestic and foreign intermediaries
and can increase efficiency by reducing regulation,
reserve requirements and interest rate controls.”
Mexico’s liberalization. Agustín Carstens,
director general of economic research of the Bank
of Mexico, agrees. In his mind, the government’s
role ought to be limited to offering efficient judi-
cial, regulatory, and supervisory systems. “This
type of government intervention is necessary to
keep financial institutions from overexposing
themselves, and the wealth of their depositors, to
risks that might be higher than socially desirable,”
Carstens said.
In developing countries, intervention for
many years had gone well beyond this, but a
wave of financial liberalization gained momentum
across Latin America in the 1980s. Mexico entered
the decade with a mass of interest rate restrictions,
domestic credit controls, fragmented financial
markets, and high reserve requirements. Compul-
sory lending to the public sector crowded out
credit to the private sector.
Mexico ended the decade by letting markets
set interest rates. It reprivatized its banks. It elimi-
nated reserve requirements on bank deposits in
1989 and a liquidity ratio in 1991. The govern-
ment encouraged development of new financial
intermediaries and the establishment of new
commercial banks. The country had 18 banks at
the time of privatization. It will end 1994 with 55
to 60 institutions, including as many as 25 subsid-
iaries of foreign banks. In addition, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will
continue the opening and liberalization of Mexico’s
financial structure. Liberalization hasn’t solved all
of Mexico’s financial market problems. For ex-
ample, there’s still a scarcity of long-term saving,
but Carstens is counting on the government’s
new system of retirement saving to help. Barnes
pointed to another risk: the inability of regulators
to keep up with changes in the financial market-
place. “Financial innovation runs rapidly,” he said.
“Regulation doesn’t run rapidly. Sometimes super-
vision in practice may lag behind. This is where
problems start.”
Did financial liberalization spur growth in
Mexico? In a statistical study, Carstens did find a
correlation between the new policies and a burst
of economic activity in the late 1980s. Even so,
the role of the reforms isn’t clear. While freeing
up financial markets, Mexico also pursued an
aggressive stabilization program, cutting inflation
and deficit spending. “It is difficult to distinguish
between the effects of financial liberalization and
those of the economic adjustment program on
financial variables,” Carstens said. In the end, the
proof that freer financial markets make a positive
contribution to growth awaits better theoretical orFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas 48
empirical foundations. Carsten’s practical advice:
“Policymakers should act as if its contribution
were meaningful. The social costs of not acting
accordingly can far outweigh any benefits.”
Liliana Rojas–Suarez, deputy division chief
for capital markets and financial studies at the
International Monetary Fund, noted that initial
conditions shape financial liberalization. Often,
the legacies of years of government intervention
in banking and finance don’t give financial re-
forms a solid ground on which to start. Banks
might hold assets lent at below-market rates, or
they may be plagued by nonperforming loans.
There might be stifled demand for credit. “The
problem with liberalizing financial markets is that
after years and decades of financial market repres-
sions, the financial sector didn’t know how to
behave as intermediaries,” Rojas–Suarez said. “The
issue is not ‘to liberalize’ or ‘not to liberalize’ but
when to liberalize.” In Argentina, for example,
banking problems triggered an intervention that
led to hyperinflation because the overexpansion
of credit did not stop. Chile faced a similar
crunch, and it avoided a price explosion by inter-
jecting money on the condition that banks restruc-
ture and reform themselves. Importantly, real
interest rates remained positive in Chile, so the
country did not go through the hyperinflation of
excessive credit creation.
According to most economists, reducing
deficit spending can benefit saving in two ways.
Directly, it will reduce the drain on domestic
saving caused by the need to finance the public
sector. Indirectly, cutting red ink will reduce
excesses that often lead to high inflation. Public
indebtedness plagues just about every Western
industrial nation. In the United States, a succession
of deficits since 1960 has left public debt at 60
percent of annual gross domestic product (GDP),
with perhaps an additional 40 percent in invisible
liabilities, Social Security, and public pensions. “A
key issue in terms of improving the national saving
performance and making room for the finance of
a higher level of investment needs to focus on
diminishing both the visible and invisible compo-
nents of public-sector dissaving,” Mussa said.
A contrarian view came from Robert Eisner,
a professor at Northwestern University. He argued
that most notions of saving and investment neglect
the driving force of economic growth. There’s
little incentive for companies to invest in a stag-
nant economy and thus little need for additional
saving. “If output stops growing, the stock of
capital cannot increase,” Eisner said. “Perhaps the
decline in the net saving ratio is a consequence,
not a cause, of the slowing of our rate of growth.”
Eisner’s emphasis on growth leads to an
iconoclastic slant on deficit spending with respect
to national saving. In 1992, gross saving and
investment in the United States totaled $741.4
billion—$986.9 billion in private saving, less
$269.1 billion on public dissaving (plus a statisti-
cal discrepancy). In the conventional view, raising
taxes or cutting government spending would
reduce budget deficits and thus increase saving.
Eisner doubts it. Raising taxes would leave Ameri-
cans less to save. Cutting spending would reduce
incomes and the ability to save. Furthermore,
when consumers have less to spend, they buy
less, hurting businesses’ sales, production, and
investment. Eisner asks: “Is the Chrysler Corp.
going to invest more or less if you stop buying?”
As a result, Eisner opposes cutting the bud-
get deficit as a remedy for America’s low saving.
Quite to the contrary, he sees the nation’s prob-
lem as slack growth. It would be a mistake, then,
to reduce the government’s economic stimulus.
Another issue arises out of the failure to recognize
that some government spending is properly re-
garded as investment—education, infrastructure,
health and research, for example. With this in-
cluded, the government dissaving falls to $96.7
billion. Budget cutting will reduce public-sector
investment, Eisner said, and the decline will not
be offset by the private sector. The economy will
suffer. In an empirical analysis, Eisner finds a
positive relationship between deficit spending and
investment. Each percentage point of red ink as a
portion of GDP added more than 1.2 percentage
points to gross private domestic investment as a
portion of GDP. Eisner’s bottom line: “The solu-
tion to imagined or real problems of an insuffi-
ciency of saving would not appear…to be found
in reducing or eliminating the budget deficit, or in
monetary tightness to slow down the economy.”
Thy neighbor’s saving
Today, money can move quickly across
borders. The opening of financial markets andEconomic Review — Third Quarter 1994 49
new technology have made it easier for investors
to seek higher rates of return outside their own
countries. Today, companies routinely invest in
enterprises abroad, and individuals buy stocks or
bonds on overseas markets. One view of the
world envisions a great savings pool: every saver
throws surplus income into a pot. Those with
projects to finance dip into the pot, at least as
long as the investment yields a positive value at
prevailing interest rates.
Conference participants doubt this is the
way the world works, even in an age of highly
integrated financial markets. Low-saving countries
aren’t likely to make up for their shortfalls by
tapping the saving of foreigners. Dini said: “My
own view is that we will certainly see greater
international integration and mobility of capital,
but also that it would be illusory and dangerous
to believe external capital can substitute [for]
rather than complement domestic saving.”
National savings still vital. Mussa assessed
some of the evidence against the notion of a
single savings pool. The international ebb and
flow of capital shows up in each country’s bal-
ance of payments statistics. Capital importing
countries run a current account deficit, and ex-
porters run a current account surplus. In recent
years, the United States emerged as a major mag-
net for foreign money, with a current account
deficit as high as $168 billion in 1987. Japan has
become the world’s largest capital exporter,
running a current account surplus of $140 billion
in 1993. Even so, current account deficits or
surpluses rarely exceed 3 percent of GDP for
industrial countries, meaning that net capital flows
generally aren’t a dominant factor in any country’s
total savings and investment.
A single savings pool, moreover, would
send money flowing here and there until all
countries offered the same rate of return. How-
ever, inflation-adjusted returns differ from one
country to another, even for publicly traded
assets. Once again, the evidence is that financial
markets retain a national character. What’s more,
some types of investment—reinvested profits and
improvements in human capital, for example—
don’t generally flow through financial markets.
Mussa concluded: “A national economy such as
[that of] the U.S. cannot escape the implications of
a low saving rate by expecting to draw on the
world pool of saving. If saving is low in the U.S.,
that will translate into an effect on investment in
the U.S. and, in effect, on growth.”
With foreign investment no longer anath-
ema, developing countries are opening their
financial markets and welcoming money from
overseas. In some capitals, the foreign funds are
regarded as a linchpin for growth. The inability of
foreign savings to compensate for low domestic
savings carries a message for these nations. The
emerging economies may be able to get some
help from foreign investors, but their own savers
will have to bear most of the burden of supplying
capital to fuel growth. The same applies to the
former Soviet republics, Eastern Europe, and
China. They will have enormous needs for new
investment. Mussa estimated it would require $8
trillion just to raise living standards in the former
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to half that of
Western Europe and China to a third of those
levels. In each case, virtually all of the money will
have to come from the country itself, Mussa said.
Moises Schwartz, the Bank of Mexico’s
deputy manager for monetary policy, worries that
Latin American countries in the 1990s may be
relying too little on domestic savings and too
much on foreign capital. “This source of financing
can disappear rapidly,” he said. According to
Schwartz, another problem could be the bidding
up of currency values, which may dampen growth
for countries that are looking to exports for eco-
nomic development.
Stephen H. Axilrod, vice chairman and
director at Nikko Securities Co. International in
New York, agreed that long-term reliance on
foreign capital is a chimera, but he contended
“there are moments in time where you can get
real benefit from net flows of capital from
abroad.” The United States in the 1980s and early
1990s might be a case in point. The country ran
huge budget deficits at a time of sagging saving.
Private investment didn’t suffer as much as it
might have because the country was able to run
current account deficits, a sign of importing capi-
tal. “I am beginning to think it helped to protect
our standard of living to a degree, while we were
going through a rather radical restructuring of our
domestic industry, thereby in the end making us
more competitive.” Axilrod acknowledged that all
foreign money isn’t equal. Countries should preferFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas 50
direct investment, which brings skills and technol-
ogy helpful to development, over portfolio invest-
ment, which may bring general savings from
abroad but can be highly volatile. A herky-jerky
flow of foreign money can be unsettling for an
economy, especially one that’s not fully developed.
The 1980s roller coaster. The Latin Ameri-
can debt crisis is evidence that money from over-
seas isn’t always a blessing. A great inflow of
other people’s savings came into Mexico, Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, and other countries in the wake
of the oil boom in 1979, lent largely through
international banks. In 1981, for example, Chile
experienced a capital inflow equal to 15 percent
of GDP. Economic growth did perk up, for at
least a little while. When economic shocks caused
international lenders to lose faith in Latin America,
the money stopped, and Latin America suffered
through a miserable decade of hyperinflation,
stagnant output, and falling standards of living.
“It was worse in some countries than the Great
Depression was in the United States,” UCLA
economist Arnold Harberger said.
If the money flows hadn’t been so large, the
problems might have been smaller, but Harberger
finds structural factors and policy responses
worsened the crisis. Latin America’s dependence
on agriculture and mining, for example, made
adjustment to the slowing of foreign investment
especially difficult. Unlike manufacturing, these
industries can’t quickly increase exports to gener-
ate foreign exchange. Supply is inelastic, and it
takes a long time to find alternatives to foreign
money. Korea, a manufacturing dynamo, also had
debt problems in the early 1980s, but it didn’t
suffer nearly as much. Its factories could quickly
make up for any change in investment flows.
Harberger also sees a “hot stove syndrome” in
Latin America: citizens burned time and again by
the economy’s zigs and zags adopt a short-term
planning horizon that only adds to instability.
On policy matters, Harberger focused on
inflation-adjusted exchange rates. With flexible
exchange rates, a big inflow of capital ought to
force an appreciation of a country’s currency.
A sharp slowdown calls for a depreciation. In
Latin America, however, exchange rate policies
tended to aim at stability in nominal terms against
the dollar. When there are negative shocks, neces-
sary adjustments to changes in the nominal ex-
change rate are short-circuited, leaving the adjust-
ment to occur in falling domestic prices. If the
deflation entails an economic slowdown that’s too
difficult for the government to handle, then there’s
usually a sudden, large devaluation. When they
come, the devaluations, inflations, or other shocks
are huge.
Argentina in the 1980s provides an example
of misguided policy. The government allowed the
exchange rate against the dollar to slip on average
just 1.25 percent a month. Domestic prices rose
much faster, at about 6 percent a month, in part
due to the stimulus from the capital inflows. In
effect, Argentina pursued a policy of paying a real
return of 4 percent to 4.5 percent a month to
holders of its currency. Had the authorities man-
aged the real exchange rate by allowing a devalu-
ation of 6 percent a month, Harberger said, the
later collapse and crises could have been avoided,
or at least substantially reduced.
The key to avoiding crises lies in stabilizing
real exchange rates. A few countries have done it,
but Harberger argued that monetary instruments
alone will be insufficient. Many Latin American
countries in the past resorted to trade restrictions.
Interest rates are another tool, but they can be
only partly effective in countries that aren’t fully
integrated with world capital markets. These
actions may not be the wisest course for a region
that relies on agriculture and mining instead of
manufacturing and that embodies the short-term
outlook of the hot stove syndrome. Obtaining the
desired results on real exchange rates, Harberger
said, may take a dose of strong medicine—a 200-
percent tariff or a very large increase in interest
rates. These, however, could have very costly side
effects. “In the end, the equilibrium real exchange
rate has its own life, and it’s hard to influence by
instruments that we like,” Harberger said.
Another debt crisis can’t be ruled out, espe-
cially in a region that’s getting a strong flow of
foreign money. Yet, Harberger contended that
recent changes in the region make it less likely.
For starters, with more manufacturing, there’s
been a diversification away from agriculture and
mining. The stability of economic policy will
improve long-term confidence. Finally, financial
reforms are allowing markets to set interest rates
and exchange values, lessening the prospects for
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Roque Fernandez, chairman of the Central
Bank of Argentina, said countries that maintain
sound economic policies at home have a better
chance of avoiding destabilizing capital flows. In
Argentina, economic reforms of the late 1980s
were negated by massive government borrowing
and hyperinflation. “All of the saving and time
deposits were government debt,” Fernandez said.
“Any expectation of inflation that built up in
nominal interest rates or produced higher interest
rates was an increase in the deficit that sooner or
later would have to be repaid by printing money.”
The government failed to convince Argentines
that it was serious about rectifying the fundamen-
tal imbalances in the economy, and the national
pastime became protecting wealth by investing in
dollars. Government policy became an exercise in
trying to stop capital flight.
The current reform effort in Argentina has
the confidence to allow unlimited convertibility of
pesos into dollars. “We just gave up the idea of
forcing people to hold pesos,” Fernandez said. “It
was impossible to control capital flight outside the
country.” Most significant, in Fernandez’s view,
the internationalization of the capital market has
been accompanied by a fiscal reform that has
eliminated crowding out of private borrowing by
government debt. As a result, Argentina isn’t likely
to fall into the short-term trap of raising interest
rates to prevent a temporary ebb of money over-
seas. Capital flows into Argentina are coming to
the private sector, not the government.
Easy convertibility does pose risks. Argen-
tina will import any instability that might affect the
United States. There’s a chance of renewed capital
flight, presenting Argentina with Harberger’s
dilemma of deflation or devaluation. Fernandez
contends Argentina would be better off maintain-
ing its fixed exchange rate policy and weathering
any decline in the domestic economy. Failure to
honor the pledge of convertibility would carry the
additional burden of eroding the hard-won cred-
ibility of the government’s fiscal policies. “We
believe one sure way of having a reversal in the
capital flow is to have a reversal of the structural
reforms,” Fernandez said. “If we go back to the
old policy of nationalization of public enterprises
or running our economy with big deficits financed
by printing money, surely we will have a real
depreciation of our currency.”
The arrival of NAFTA. The North American
Free Trade Agreement will affect saving and
investment in the United States, Mexico, and
Canada. Eventually, it may impact other countries
if free trade expands farther into Latin America.
According to Edward W. Kelley, a member of the
Federal Reserve System’s Board of Governors,
NAFTA will facilitate the integration of the conti-
nent’s financial markets through provisions for
capital mobility, unrestricted market entry, and
effective but nondiscriminatory regulation. Accord-
ing to Barnes, Mexico expects to benefit: “NAFTA
will create a better and more competitive finan-
cial system in Mexico, improve the financial tech-
nology and innovation.”
The new openness should improve the
allocation of resources in North America. In fact,
emerging patterns of cross-border money flows
can already be detected. After implementation of
the U.S.–Canada free trade pact in 1989, the
United States quickly became a net exporter of
capital to Canada for the first time in a decade.
Mexico’s inflows began rising even before the
trade deal became official, and Kelley expects the
movement of money to the south to continue.
Edwin M. Truman, staff director of the
Division of International Finance for the Fed’s
Board of Governors, said NAFTA brings together
nations that might not be setting aside enough
money to meet their investment needs. “The first
thing, perhaps, we should worry about is the fact
that all three countries have declining saving
rates,” he said. “From that perspective, some have
suggested that this [NAFTA] is not the ideal com-
bination of countries.” Truman noted, however,
that under NAFTA’s market integration there is
increased mutual interest in the success of policies
that are beneficial to all partner countries.
The new trade agreement might expose the
United States, Mexico, and Canada to real or
financial shocks beyond their immediate control.
Both Kelley and Truman stressed that North
American financial integration of the financial
markets put a premium on policy consistency and
cooperation. Truman saw a need for greater
cooperation in banking supervision, including
such topics as interstate banking in the United
States. “Policymakers must be on their toes, alert
to deal with problems, real and perceived, antici-
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tends that sound macroeconomic policies will
become more important. “A country with inappro-
priate or unstable policies, such as persistent fiscal
deficits or low domestic savings, may have diffi-
culty in attracting foreign investment, especially if
investors perceive significant risk of repayment
problems,” Kelley said. “Such an economy may
also experience capital flight.” Monetary policies,
moreover, need to keep price increases from
diverging too far from the inflation of neighboring
nations. In the past seven years, Mexico elimi-
nated its budget deficit. U.S. attempts to reduce its
red ink have been less successful. The Canadian
deficit at 5 percent of GDP presents a challenge
to the new government of Prime Minister Jean
Chretien. If the United States and Canada can
reduce their deficits, public borrowing will cease
to dominate the capital flows in North America.
“As the largest economy in North America, the
United States must pursue sound policies, not just
in its own interests but also because U.S. policy
actions can have serious repercussions for its
regional partners,’’ Kelley said.
The banking sectors in Mexico and Canada
are much smaller than that of the United States.
Both countries will face the possibility of competi-
tion with the opening of their markets. John Chant,
a professor at Simon Fraser University in British
Columbia, expects NAFTA to have little impact on
Canada’s domestic banking industry. Nationwide
banking makes Canada’s institutions the size they
need to compete. Extensive, geographically dis-
persed networks of branches makes it expensive
for newcomers to gain a foothold in the market.
“Canadian banks will not have to worry much
about the home front,” Chant said. Rather than in-
roads by U.S. banks, Chant foresees opportunities
for Canadian banks in the United States, especially
with the removal of barriers to interstate banking.
Canadian banks are already established in the
United States, and they understand well how to
operate branch systems. Ricardo Guajardo, director
general of Grupo Financiero Bancomer in Mexico
City, believes that Mexico will experience a sig-
nificant increase in U.S. and Canadian competition
in both the consumer and corporate markets.
NAFTA phases in the opening of Mexico’s market,
giving domestic banks some breathing room, but
eventually they will have to adjust. “We have to
reorient the way we do business,” Guajardo said.
“We have to obtain a high degree of specializa-
tion. We have to have a very clear focus on where
we can compete and where we cannot.”
Conclusions
The Dallas Fed’s conference on saving
coalesced around several conclusions: saving is
important to economic growth because it pro-
motes investment and technological progress.
Many factors influence saving, but from a policy
perspective, low inflation, sound fiscal policy,
stability, and financial liberalization increase at
least the efficiency of saving. Even in a world of
increasingly large cross-border capital flows,
nations still rely overwhelmingly on their own
domestic savings. Open capital markets carry
risks, but they will be minimized in countries that
avoid excesses in fiscal and monetary policies.
In most respects, these conclusions centered
on the ideological trends shaping the 1990s.
Countries in most parts of the world—especially
in Latin America—are moving away from reliance
on government and toward free market policies
that emphasize macroeconomic stability. These
policies may not be coming into favor primarily
with saving in mind, but it is reassuring to know
that they help with what’s now recognized as an
important component of an economy’s long-term
prospects.